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ABSTRACT:
Merger activity in the pharmaceutical industry has increased considerably over the last
five years. Moreover, current literature suggests that tender offers have higher
announcement period returns for bidders and cash mergers have higher returns to the
combined firm. Therefore, in this study I examine techniques of successful mergers and
their integration process. In particular, I examine 83 mergers from 1995 to 2000 to test
the relationship between the announcement period returns and the following variables:
method of payment, transaction type, and merger length, over the same period of time.
Contrary to prior studies, I find little evidence that these traditional variables affect the
announcement period returns in the pharmaceutical industry. In addition, I find that
pharmaceutical mergers are shorter in duration compared to the overall market.
Moreover, target shareholders enjoy substantial gains in the short-run, while the bidders
incur insignificant losses. While these results are similar to prior studies of nonpharmaceutical mergers, the combined effects on the returns of the merged firm are
inconclusive. Further studies will need to examine additional variables such as asset size
and profitability measures, among others, to better determine the motivations for mergers
in the pharmaceutical industry.

Mergers and Acquisitions in the Phannaceutical

Industry

Dorota Bednarczyk*

Abstract
Merger activity in the pharmaceutical industry has increased considerably over the last five years.
Moreover, current literature suggests that tender offers have higher announcement period returns for
bidders and cash mergers have higher returns to the combined firm. Therefore, in this study I examine
techniques of successful mergers and their integration process. In particular, I examine 83 mergers from
1995 to 2000 to test the relationship between the announcement period returns and the following variables:
method of payment, transaction type, and merger length, over the same period of time. Contrary to prior
studies, I find little evidence that these traditional variables affect the announcement period returns in the
pharmaceutical industry. In addition, I find that pharmaceutical mergers are shorter in duration compared to
the overall market. Moreover, target shareholders enjoy substantial gains in the short-run, while the bidders
incur insignificant losses. While these results are similar to prior studies of non-pharmaceutical mergers,
the combined effects on the returns of the merged firm are inconclusive. Further studies will need to
examine additional variables such as asset size and profitability measures, among others, to better
determine the motivations for mergers in the pharmaceutical industry.
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1. Introduction
This study will examme the different aspects of mergers and acquisitions that
contribute to wealth creation for a firm in the pharmaceutical industry. In the 1990's, mergers
were used as a main tool to maximize stockholders' value, as well as to sustain a firm's
competitiveness in the market. However, the process of merging is very complicated in itself;
therefore, it must be undertaken with the utmost precision and planning. There are many
potential pitfalls when undertaking a merger: lack of synergies, excessive diversification,
lack of an integration plan, inadequate communication, and/or a loss of top talent. In the
study, I will examine the different merger and integration techniques that contribute to a
success in the pharmaceutical industry. Furthermore, this study will consider a set of
variables: method of payment, transaction type, length of a merger, and merger value.
Regressions will be run to test which variables, if any, explain differences among stock
returns of the combined firm.
In the previous decade, mergers and acquisitions activity was an important method of
market growth. From the bidder's perspective, however, not all mergers result in profits as
anticipated. The questions remain, what are the common characteristics of successful
endeavors, and are there any identifiable mistakes that lead to failure? As the economy enters
a recession era, mergers and acquisitions activity (M&A) could be a market strategy to
strengthen a firm's position in the overall market when the economy improves. While some
firms may limit their M&A due to lack of funding and prepare for the recession, other firms
may do just the opposite: strengthen their core capabilities and make strategic acquisitions
that will help them to survive in the long run.
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2. Literature Review
2.1. Definition of mergers
In the 1990's, M&A activity increased dramatically. Some of the factors that
influenced

this increase in activity include development

of global markets, technological

innovation, and deregulation of regulated industries. Mergers and acquisitions had a
significant impact on the economy in terms of overall job growth as well as employment
patterns. For many firms, the need for globalization was created not only by increasing
foreign and domestic competition, but also by the growing and changing needs of their
consumers. For example, in 1999, the introduction of the common currency (EURG) in the
European Union (EU) created a forum for increased cross-border commercial activity. The
European Union enhanced foreign competition in terms of import penetration, as measured
by the ratio of imports to the total industry supply (Weston and Jawien, 1999). The increased
international as well as domestic competition created a need for firms to find new ways to cut
costs and gain viable efficiencies.
Furthermore, the 1990's saw an explosion of information technology along with
technology-based systems and services. Particularly, the Internet revolution irreversibly
changed the way firms conduct business. Access to the Internet allowed "smart consumers"
to gain access to information about goods and services, and in turn demand faster and more
cost-effective service. Such pressure has made it necessary for firms to simultaneously
reduce costs and increase efficiency in order to meet their bottom line obligations. Moreover,
deregulation is yet another factor that has contributed to the increase in merger activities. For
example, the Graham Leach Bliley Act of 1999 repealed the Glass Steagall Act (Depression
era regulation)

and has significantly

affected the insurance, banking, securities,
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and utility

industries (Wall and Wall, 2000). In particular, the removal of Depression era laws in the
financial services industry has for the first time in over 70 years created the possibility of
financial services companies providing one-stop shopping, and is likely to cause an increase
in financial mergers in the future.
In general, mergers take place in an attempt to maximize shareholder wealth and to
gain a competitive position in the market. Gowrisankaran, 1999 indicates that, "mergers
decrease the competition in the industry, [mergers] are also a mechanism for increasing the
capacity, which substitutes the investment, mergers are a way for firms to grow more
rapidly."

Some of the existing theories that attempt to explain the occurrence of mergers

involve differential efficiency strategy, as well as operating and financial synergy strategies.
Differential efficiency strategy implies that a firm with an excess of managerial capabilities
and efficiencies will acquire another firm, which lacks competence in that area. By acquiring
such a firm, the buyer will realize gains by improving the acquired firm's efficiency.
However, operating synergy suggests that a merger occurs to utilize economies of
scale. In this case, firms complement one another in their operational capabilities to achieve a
more efficient corporation. Finally, the financial synergy theory supports the view that the
firms merge to match their financing opportunities in terms of realizing their internal cash
flow capabilities. Such a deal allows the involved firms to decrease their cost of capital and
to find new and enticing investment opportunities that otherwise would not be available
(Weston, Siu, and Johnson, 2001).
Finally, there are many different types of mergers. The most basic classification
distinguishes between vertical and horizontal mergers, both of which are very popular in the
pharmaceutical

industry.

In both cases, mergers are intended to expand the market power of
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a given firm, and as a result, enhance its competitiveness. In general, horizontal mergers
occur between two firms in the same industry. By combining resources, the new union is able
to exploit economies of scale as well as complementary resource allocation.
A vertical merger, however, entails a combination of firms in the same line on the
supply chain. For example, a vertical merger is undergone when a pharmaceutical firm
acquires a supplier of either its components or finished products. The rationale behind such
mergers is the idea that vertical integration allows a firm to decrease its input supply costs as
well as to improve supply efficiency and reliability of supply access.

2.2. Anatomy of the merger process
For the most part, mergers m the pharmaceutical

industry exhibit similar

characteristics to mergers in other industries. The process itself is defined by a series of steps
which involve necessary due diligence, integration planning, and an implementation
processes. One of the leading pharmaceutical companies, Baxter International, uses a merger
model further described by Wall and Wall (2000).
The model consists of the following stages:
~

Strategic Planning (Due Diligence)

~

Preliminary Analysis (Due Diligence)

~

Detailed Analysis-Negotiation

~

Closing (Integration Planning)

~

Value Creation (Integration/Implementation)

(Due Diligence)

Strategic Planning is, in essence, the firm's long-term view of its policy, culture and

procedures, which is executed either formally or informally through a set of preexisting
policies (Weston, Siu, and Johnson, 2001). During this step, a firm performs an analysis to
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determine its strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats. Strengths and weaknesses are
internal qualities, while opportunities and threats come from the firm's external environment.
Such analysis further enables the firm to recognize areas that need to be improved. Moreover,
utilizing the knowledge gained from the strategic planning process, the acquirer attempts to
identify firms that pass a certain criterion of financial fit and potential for growth. In this
stage, the firm proceeds into the Preliminary Analysis. Wall and Wall (2000) describe the
following characteristics that buyers attempt to identify in potential targets:
> The types of technological, intellectual and operational assets that the firm
anticipates acquiring, and why
> Anticipated market expansion, defined in terms of customer groups or geography
> Products acquisitions and iri what markets they would be introduced
> The factors which will create economies of scale, if applicable
> The types of possible synergies obtained, in terms of size, efficiency or scope
> Corporate culture of a potential acquisition candidate that would best fit with
current culture.
This list of potential qualities could be longer, depending upon the acquiring firm and
the industry within which it operates. In general, pharmaceutical firms attempt to obtain
various intellectual and physical assets and technologies that would give them competitive
advantages (research and development, scientific expertise, patents, trademarks, etc.).
Finally, the preliminary analysis attempts to identify the main competitors and their market
share within the given market or market segment.
The next step is a Detailed Analysis, which utilizes the above characteristics to reduce
the list of candidates to those that meet the desired criteria. The resources employed consist
of publicly available information such as annual reports, Internet sources, as well as
information gathered from customers or professionals in the industry. The detailed analysis is
an extremely time-consuming process that requires a great deal of qualitative and quantitative
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evaluation. Once a firm identifies an acquisition prospect, it would next approach the other
party to determine whether there is mutual interest in undertaking a merger.
From this point forward, the firms have advanced into the Negotiation stage.
The key to successful negotiations is an effective and open communication between the
partners. Both sides need to establish their expectations about the nature of the future
operations of the company; they must also address who will control the newly merged
company, how will the business be evaluated, and how will decisions be made?
After these questions are addressed, the buyer needs to complete the due diligence
process by reevaluating the target to ensure the soundness of the agreement. If allowed, the
acquirer closely examines the seller's data to gain better understanding of the candidate's
cost structure, customer base and company policies regarding employee relations and the
environment. This examination attempts to elucidate the possible synergies, which may be
achieved through the merger.
After the due diligence process, the buyer then makes an initial offer, accompanied by
a letter of intent. Once these are in place, the buyer is most likely allowed even greater access
to the seller's proprietary information. When the target is a competitor, however, such access
may be withheld until the deal is closed. In other cases, the target protects its assets with a
non-disclosure agreement, which prevents the bidder from benefiting from any gained
information about target, including customer data. If the deal "goes south," the parties may
also be protected by break-up fees and agreements that limit the number of shares available
to be purchased.
As the final step III the due diligence
companies

process,

the board of directors

must approve the union; at this point, the official announcement
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of both

is made to the

shareholders and the employees. At this point of the process, the need for clear
communication between all stakeholders cannot be overemphasized. The goal of the
communication is not only to transmit the necessary information to all parties involved, but
also to gain their approval, support, and participation. During a merger it is inevitable that
changes will occur.
To ensure a smooth transition, management's

first step is to identify all the

stakeholders: the employees, the shareholders, and the customers. Each group has its own
unique set of concerns associated with the merger. Shareholders need to be assured that their
investment will continue to be profitable and that they are better off agreeing to undertake a
merger. In many cases, when a merger or broad restructuring is announced, employees
immediately assume that part of the work force will be eliminated; this creates anxiety and a
potential loss of key employees. In reality, firms do eliminate redundant employees to reduce
duplication, reduce costs, and to increase operational efficiency. The employees' concerns
need to be addressed, especially the concerns of key employees. To address these issues,
management must explain to employees their role in the new endeavor, and discuss
compensation changes, if applicable.
However, the process is not yet complete. Until the deal is closed, both firms can still
back out of the deal if either party has doubts that the deal will deliver the anticipated
benefits. When entering the Closing stage, most firms form transition teams to move from the
due diligence into the integration planning process. This is done because even a well thought
out strategy can fail if executed poorly: "The primary purpose of a transition team should not
be to develop or validate strategy. The purpose should be to accelerate implementation
strategy" (Feldman and Spratt, 1999).
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Transition teams are comprised of members of different expertise levels who work
together to unify particular strategic business units or specific areas of the business, such as
information technology or human resources. Once the extensive legal requirements are met,
the firms close the deal. About 90 days after closing, the post-closing integration process
begins and can potentially continue for up to two years. The post-integration phase is also
where the Value Creation state begins as the newly combined firms attempt to build upon
anticipated synergies and integrate all operations.

2.3. Mergers in the pharmaceutical industry
A record number of mergers in the 1990's occurred in the financial services and
technology industries, with the number of pharmaceutical mergers considerably lower. This
trend, however, is expected to change. In particular, the number of pharmaceutical mergers in
the late 1990's increased significantly and activity is expected to intensify even more in the
years to come. Kager and Malek (2001) suggest that pharmaceutical firms should" Get ready
to merge or diverge," because of increased competition, declining market share, and price
rivalry among firms in the industry.
The pharmaceutical industry has one of the lowest market concentrations in the U.S.
In the last six years, pharmaceutical firms have undertaken numerous mergers that have
considerably
pharmaceutical

increased

market

share.

As

competition

more

aggressIve,

firms were forced to identify VarIOUS cost savmg strategies

and growth

modes. For example, Merck, the largest pharmaceutical

became

company in the U.S, has doubled its

market share since 1994 to a current 8%. Moreover, the top five pharmaceutical companies,
over the same period, boosted their combined market share by 40%. In an industry analysis,
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Deloitte Consulting (1996) concluded that the five largest pharmaceutical firms in the U.S
are expected to grow 85% by the end of 2005 (from a combined market share of 22% today
to 40% in 2005). This growth is expected to be realized through consolidation, research and
development (R&D), new product lines, and by building strategic alliances.
Kager and Malek (2001) hypothesize that, although it appears firms achieve savings
from mergers, in reality those savings are illusory. This misconception is created when firms
plan on increasing market share as their product portfolio increases. In theory, a larger
portfolio should increase market penetration resulting from greater access to pharmaceutical
supplies; but in fact, the market study suggests that such market expansion is overrated.
Another theory suggests that R&D productivity may not increase at all as the result of
a merger, since increasing the complexity of operations may hinder achieving economies of
scale. A final theory indicates that the increase in efficiency and productivity will materialize
as the R&D budget increases and the technological investment costs are spread into a larger
budget pool. The issues associated with R&D are complex, since these operations require a
highly trained and educated labor and a highly specialized workspace.
When combining the R&D of two companies, firms often decide to move one of the
facilities, creating potential physical and human capital obstacles. First, it may be
cumbersome to move equipment and second, the scientists involved in a particular endeavor
may not be eager to relocate. Hence, the combined firm may lose some of its vital talent and
see its research and development falter. The evidence of the effect of mergers on R&D,
therefore, remains inconclusive.
Similar problems arise with an increase in the sales force. A study of U.S sales forces
by Kager and Malek (2001) indicates that among the top 40 pharmaceutical
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companies,

the

sales force has risen from 38,000 in 1996 to 80,000 in the year 2000. The question remains
whether this increase in the sales force has created a proportionate increase in product sales.
This seems doubtful, since the sales calls over the same time period increased, but at much
less significant rate.
Other cost savings have also been overstated.

In particular, in some cases the

mergmg companies fail to capitalize on manufacturing and administrative cost savings
because

of 0 headcount

duplication.

Therefore,

while

mergers

can create

value

for

pharmaceutical companies, the success is not assured. Firms must exercise considerable
discipline, extensive planning, and sound judgment when evaluating targets. The recent track
record of merging pharmaceutical firms suggests that investors must rigorously scrutinize
each merger. According to Kager and Malek (2001), the last three large mergers in the
pharmaceutical industry created a negative reaction in the financial markets. In particular, the
combined valuation of the merging companies fell approximately 10% to 20% at the
announcement date.
The final potential obstacle to a successful merger is the latest change in the
accounting methods that evaluate merger activity. In the past, mergers were accounted for
using the "pooling of interest" method. Under this method, the acquired company's value
was based on the depreciated cost, not the market price. Currently, merger accounting
requires the "purchase" method, which treats the difference between the market price and the
book value as an increase in the book value of the acquired assets. The main difference
between these systems is that the purchase method requires acquisition costs and profits to be
reported to the business units that directly relate to the transaction. This accounting rule
change translates into changes in the valuation of the earnings per share (BPS) as well as
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other profitability

ratios. As a result, it IS important

for investors

to be aware of such

discrepancies.
Despite

all the difficulties,

mergers can create value and provide growth for the

pharmaceutical companies and their stakeholders. The realization of these gains, however,
requires work and preparation. Due to increasing competition, rising costs and globalization
of the industry, M&A activity in the pharmaceutical industry is expected to continue to grow
as these firms seek to increase market share, which in turn will have an effect on the future
composition of the market.

2.4. Merger hypotheses
2.4.1. Initial announcement period stock returns will be positive for targets, negative for
bidders, and positive for the combined firms
Explanation:

Assuming

that the pharmaceutical

industry behaves similarly to the

overall market, bidder's stock returns should decline around the merger announcement, while
target's returns should increase. Moreover, the combined effect of the merger should be to
create overall positive wealth effects. Such discrepancy in returns is likely due to the market
reaction to the merger and public opinion of the future profitability of the union. Earlier
studies of non-pharmaceutical mergers have demonstrated that targets gained approximately
20% to 25%, while bidders experienced negative cumulative abnormal returns.
Furthermore, the evidence shows a relationship between the pre-bid run up and the
post-announcement stock price of a target in non-pharmaceutical industries. As a result, I
examine target, bidder, and combined returns seven days around the merger announcement.
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2.4.2. A faster integration process should lead to higher merger returns
Explanation:

The speed of the integration process is crucial to the success of the

merger. The results will be measured by examining stock returns from the sample firms with
the length of their completion period. I assume that a fast integration process allows a bidder
firm to quickly resume its position in the market and to reposition itself before the
competition has time to react to the merger. In terms of management, speed is also important
because it minimizes the target's employee uncertainty and trepidation about the future; and
therefore, overall morale is maintained and key employees are retained.
Furthermore, Feldman and Spratt (1999) hypothesize that in any industry,

"[A]

prolonged transition adds cost, slows growth, destroys profit, and decreases cash flow. It
prolongs the pain and reduces or postpones the payback. There is no value in prolonged
transition." Alternatively, a quick integration period may be an indication of a hasty merger
that has not been carefully planned and/or executed. As a result, I examine merger lengths in
relation to announcement period returns

2.4.3. Horizontal mergers can adversely affect a firm 's earning potential
Explanation:

Examining diversified versus focused mergers; firms that choose to

diversify too broadly tend to loose their focus on their core competencies. By doing so they
may achieve the effect opposite of what they anticipated: they may lose their competitiveness
in the market. In the pharmaceutical industry, firms form horizontal mergers in order to
replace products for which their patents have expired, or to develop their portfolio of
products. In theory this seems to be a smooth procedure, but in reality firms encounter
various problems, which could negatively impact their bottom line. For example, integrating
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R&D facilities can be difficult, combining sales forces may not be as effective as expected,
and the reduction of various administrative costs may not be fully attainable. While moderate
diversity across product lines and services can be beneficial, great caution is advised: activity
diversified mergers tend to create less wealth gains than focused mergers. This hypothesis
will be further examined by reviewing previous evidence in the literature.

3. Data Collection and Analysis
3.1. Data
3.1.1. Merger sample
To create a merger sample, all pharmaceutical companies, which completed a merger
between 1995 and 2000, were examined. Specifically, the sample covers mergers announced
on or after January 1, 1995 and completed on or before December 31,2000. The firms were
selected based on the following characteristics: i) 3-digit SIC codes of: 2830, 3693, 3841,
3842,3844,3845,3850,3851;

ii) publicly available data; and iii) firms were fully acquired.

Additional data were collected which included announcement and completion dates,
CUSIPs, acquisition price, transaction type, and form of payment. Some of these variables
were used in the regression analysis and are discussed further. The initial screening returned
83 pharmaceutical companies, of which 21 firms were removed because the bidder was an
international entity (public data were either limited or unavailable). An additional 15 firms
were removed for the following reasons: three firms because they were not fully acquired and
14 because the bidder was private. Lastly, the screening eliminated two companies who were
partially owned subsidiaries because they were acquired by the parent firm. The final merger
sample consists of 45 mergers from 1995-2000. The sources used for the sample creation
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were Merger Statistical Reviews (1995-2000), lOKs, proxy statements, the Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) tapes, and news releases (Lexis Nexis and others).

3.1.2. Stock returns
The study will incorporate the pre-and-post return data to elucidate the merger
profitability as a function of such variables as length of merger, transaction type, and form of
payment. These variables are believed to have direct influence on the abnormal returns of the
combined firm. Accordingly, the returns are accumulated individually for the target and the
seller and for the combined entity over a seven-day event window (-5, +1) around the
announcement of the merger.

3.1.3. Length of merger
It is perceived that the speed of the merger is an important factor in its profitability. A
rapid transaction allows the combined firm to asses its position in the market, shields it from
competitors' reactions and allows it to capitalize on potential synergies. Based on these
factors, it is assumed that the faster the merger is completed, the higher the abnormal returns
experienced by the combined firm. For the analysis, the measurement basis is the number of
days from the announcement date to the completion date.

3.1.4. Lines of business
Diverse lines of business of pharmaceutical compames have proven difficult to
evaluate as these firms offer multiple product lines and services.
attempting to match firms for comparisons,

In particular, when

it is difficult to accurately find matched firms
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with similar servIces. Therefore, great effort is required to perform compansons with
relevance and accuracy. Possible distinctions could be made between firms, which market
themselves as medical suppliers, healthcare firms, medical firms, or a combination of these.
Depending on their differening markets and activities, the firms' characteristics may differ.

3.1.5. Form of payment
Various studies suggest that overall wealth creation from acquisitions, in terms of
pre-acquisition and post-acquisition returns, is a function of the method of payment. Firms
prefer to use their stock as payment in a given transaction if they believe that their stock is
overvalued on the market. In the opposite case, they choose to use cash financing because
they believe that their stock is undervalued. Furthermore, this complies with the asymmetric
information hypothesis and the market underreaction hypothesis (Myers and Majluf, 1984).
The rationale behind the payment method is the idea that paying with stock while the stock is
believed to be overvalued maximizes benefits to current stockholders. At the announcement
of the merger, the market underreacts to the payment terms, and this in turn is reflected in the
post-acquisition abnormal returns. Consistent with these hypotheses, Loughran and Vijh
(1997) finds that, for a sample of 947 acquisitions from 1970-1989, the stock mergers
provided weak wealth gains versus the cash mergers during that same time period.
This study examines possible methods of payment in the pharmaceutical industry,
including stock-for-stock, cash, or a mix of cash and stock. For analysis purposes, cash,
stock or the combination of both were assigned numerical reference. Hence, cash financing
equals one, stock equals two and the combination of both equals three. On occasion, the news
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releases were ambiguous in terms of transaction terms, and in such cases the numerical
classification was inconclusive and not included.
Results from Table 3 indicate that stock-for stock was the most frequent form of
payment from 1995 to 2000; approximately 75% of the mergers used stock only. Other
forms such as cash or the mix of cash and stock were also observed, but much less
frequently. This reliance on stock is in-line with results from previous studies, which suggest
approximately 60% of all public mergers in the 1990's used stock (Becher, 2000).

3.1.6. Transaction type/mode
The transaction mode along with the payment method, are both examined in terms of
wealth creation. It is believed that there is a difference in pre-acquisition and post-acquisition
combined returns, and such disparity is inherent in the very nature of each transaction.
Mergers are often friendly endeavors, which are in greater or lesser degree approved by the
target's management and board of directors. On the contrary, tender offers are frequently
made directly to target shareholders, often in spite of target management's

opposition

(Loughran and Vijh, 1997). As the market reacts to the merger, tender offers are frequently
perceived to reflect a greater confidence on the buyer side, in terms of the future efficiency
gains from operating synergies.
In this study, the transaction type merger or tender offer is used as a variable in
assessing the profitability of the acquisitions. Prior research indicates that numerous
transactions in financial services and banking industry were made through tender offer
approach. Therefore, in T~ble 2 I examine the frequency and impact of the transaction type
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on mergers in the pharmaceutical industry. The results indicate that while the number of
tender offers varies by year, the overwhelming majority of transactions have been mergers.

4. Tests of Hypotheses
4.i. initial stock returns
Merger stock returns should be positive for targets, negative for bidders, but positive
for the combined firms
of acquisitions.

Prior research suggests that target shareholders gain from all types

Loughran and Vijh (1997) reject this view based on results from 947

acquisitions completed between 1970 and1989.

The authors find that in only one

circumstance do targets gain from any type of mergers: when shareholders sell out soon after
the effective date of acquisition. In the case of shareholders who hold onto the bidder's stock
received as the form of payment during the merger, they experience diminishing gains during
the following months.
Moreover, Loughran and Vijh (1997) find that, during the five-year period following
an acquisition, (on average) firms that completed stock mergers earned significantly negative
excess returns of 61.7%, which equates to a compounded

annual loss of 10.1%.

Furthermore, over the combined pre-and-prost merger time periods, target shareholders in
possession of the bidder's stock did not earn significantly positive excess returns. Finally,
Loughran and Vijh (1997) find an association between the post-acquisition returns, the mode
of acquisition, and form of payment.
At first glance, these negative return findings could be alarming; however, the key is
the interpretation. Weston and Jawien (1999) supply an explanation that shows how these
seemingly

negative results, under further scrutiny, are actually positive:

"acquiring

firms

were reported to have negative 25% return to shareholders in stock for stock mergers. This
17

number, however, represents the difference between acquirer returns and the returns to
shareholders of matching firms. This return to shareholders of acquiring firms over the five
years was a positive 62%, representing a compound annual return of 10.1%; for matching
firms the returns were 87%, or 13.3% compounded annually." These results indicate that
there is no consensus on the long-run returns following an acquisition.
In the case of the tender offers, the shareholders of the acquiring firms enjoyed 62%
higher positive returns. The evidence from this study suggests that for bidders, tender offers
are more profitable. Moreover, the study emphasizes that there is a significant difference in
target and bidder returns that varies depending on the mode of transaction (merger, tender
offer) and the form of payment (stock, cash, or both).
To apply these findings to the pharmaceutical industry, I examine target and bidder
returns in terms of method of payment and the transaction mode. Additionally, the study will
test other variables such as transaction value and the length of time from announcement to
completion. The rationale behind this analysis is that merger returns in the pharmaceutical
industry are similarly to the rest of the market.
The focus of this study is on a profitability period over a seven-day window. In
addition, if markets are efficient, then the stocks price reaction today is the markets best
indication of future returns. Summary statistics from Table 1 indicate that target shareholders
in the pharmaceutical industry experience significant returns; on average they gain 19.11%
around the merger announcement date. The range of possible returns is very wide; the
highest return targets are able to obtain is 96.7% and the lowest is a loss of 20.3%. The
median target return is 15.8%. Bidder shareholders lose an average of 2%. The maximum
gain to the bidder shareholder is 25% and the biggest loss is 27%, with a median loss of 1%.
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For the combined entity, the average pharmaceutical merger had an insignificant loss
of 0.7%: the most successful gained 23.2% and the least lost 22.6% (median value reflects an
insignificant gain of 0.4%). Therefore, it is not clear whether pharmaceutical mergers are
value-creating endeavors. One explanation suggests that pharmaceutical mergers result in
few, but very large, negative losses. Hence, those large losses significantly lower the average
sample returns. Further, contrast to the rest of the market, phannaceutical merger returns are
not statistically related to the form of payment, transaction mode, nor any other variables that
were tested in this study. However, there are other variables that may need to be considered
such as the size of both firms and their profitability (return on assets and return on equity).

4.2. Integration process
In any industry, the speed of the integration process is vital to all stakeholders, and
eventually to the success of the merger. The parties in question are the investors, employees,
management team, and customers. A 1996 PricewaterhouseCoopers survey indicated that the
speed of the transition was of great importance to bidders and sellers. Of the companies
examined, the firms who performed an accelerated integration following a merger disclosed
that they were able to achieve 80% of their objectives on a timely basis. In addition, this
rapid adjustment was positively related to significant performance measures such as gross
margin, margin cash flow, productivity, profitability, and stock price. Further, nine out of ten
executives admitted that if they could repeat the process, they would strive to speed the
transition even more (Feldman and Spratt, 1999).
This finding is significant in several ways. First, it emphasizes the specific goals that

the firms intend to achieve. Usually, after a merger, a firm experiences a great deal of
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confusion and uncertainty. Employees and management teams alike are exposed to a variety
of labor relations' issues such as elimination of work force and, therefore, job security. If
such decisions are to be made, it is better for all parties involved to address these issues
quickly, since the productivity of the entire enterprise could be at stake. If downsizing is to
occur, it is better to do so quickly to minimize the costs of duplicated labor, and to allow
former employees to move forward. Such actions are highly correlated with productivity,
efficiency and therefore profit margin.
Another issue in the integration process is the competition's reaction to the merger
activities. Competitors are also aware of the difficulties the merging firms face, and thus are
more likely to try to lure away customers in order to expand market share. Rivals are able to
attract customers because service often detoriates shortly after a merger, due to sales force
disorganization and customer uncertainty. As a result, speed of action and adequate
communication is essential. The advantages of a quick transition process are countless, and it
is reasonable to assume that pharmaceutical mergers encounter similar issues in the transition
phase, as do firms in other industries.
Examining the sample of pharmaceutical firms, it is interesting to note that the
pharmaceutical mergers appear to be completed much more quickly than those in other
industries. From 1995-2000, most pharmaceutical mergers were completed in less than 4
months, with an overall average of 4.6 months (139 days). Only in 1998 did the merging
process take longer, averaging 7.8 months (236 days). Prior studies suggest that in banking
industry the average merger takes approximately 273 days to complete. As a result it is quite
an anomaly that pharmaceuticals are able to perform the transition so quickly (See Table 3).
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Contrary to pnor assumptions, the regressIOn analysis concluded that in the
pharmaceutical industry, target, bidder and combined returns, are not statistically related to
the length of the merger. As indicated, none of the variables explain in this study explain the
stock returns; therefore, other variable should be further examined.

4.3. Horizontal mergers
In general, horizontal mergers are undertaken to generate economies of scale as well
as to gain efficiency in the cost of production and distribution. Whether the efficiency is
actually achieved is open to debate, however. The side effects of horizontal mergers can be
undesirable. It is not uncommon, for example, for the initial output of the merged firm to
decline. This happens because the firms are still in the process of integration and of realizing
their synergies; frequently, a period of time must pass before the new firm is able to
capitalize on the transaction. In a competitive environment where the number of firms
declines, prices often rise. The non-participating, competitive firms may actually benefit
from the union, because they may expand production and enjoy the inflated prices. Overall,
for two firms to merge, the industry prices must increase sufficiently to offset the output
declines of merged firms (Perry and Porter, 1985).
Evidence from the non-pharmaceutical industries suggests that there is a limit to the
benefits from corporate growth.

If firms become too large, they introduce fewer new

products, offer higher prices, and slowly phase out of the competitive arena, giving away to
younger and faster competitors. Another obstacle to horizontal merger is reaching economies
of scale and decreasing operating expenses; both may prove to be very elusive.
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A 1996 PricewaterhouseCoopers study examined the process of achieving economies
of scale by reducing operating expenses in corporate mergers. Operating cost reduction is one
of the top incentives for mergers (the fourth objective) of 38% of respondents. However, it is
only the eleventh most frequently achieved objective (by 15% of respondents). The survey
concluded that cost reductions are much harder to attain than one might expect.
Beyond simply eliminating duplication and cutting unnecessary overhead cost, a
merged firm needs to achieve a comprehensive modification of work processes. Such action
involves additional training for retained workers, downsizing, and confronting the dispirited
morale of workers concerned about job security. As a result of these complications, it is quite
common for firms involved in mergers to experience material decreases in productivity of
approximately 20% to 30%. This decrease in productivity can offset or even outweigh
expected savings achieved through to downsizing (Feldman and Spratt, 1999).
According to Robinson (1996), "multiproduct diversification is a hallmark of the
modem corporation and the single most important form of organizational expansion in health
care." Apparently, expanding the product line could be one source of a competitive
advantage if the products are related. The desired efficiency can be reached by jointly using
productive inputs and core competencies of both firms. Different outcomes occur, however,
if the products are unrelated; it is difficult to transfer the competitive advantage to new
product lines and to outperform the external markets. Thus, diversification of unrelated
products often fails, forcing firms into narrower product lines. Diversified mergers in the
pharmaceutical industry mayor may not create wealth for merging companies.

The end

result depends on the firms' particular characteristics as well as their product line strategy.
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4.4. Summary statistics
Finally, prior studies examine the method of payment and merger value to explain
differences in merger returns. Examining the method of payment, it was found that most
mergers were based on a stock-for-stock transaction (33 out of 45 companies) with the
highest concentration of this type of transaction in 1998. Of the remaining mergers, eight
were cash transactions, and five were a combination of cash and stock.
The analysis of average merger price reveals that the values increase steadily, peaking
in 1998 at over $3 billion; the average is $1.3 billion per year. In conclusion, it is interesting
to note that 1998 appears different from all the other years. Not only was the transition period
from the announcement to completion significantly longer than in other years (7.8 months
versus 4 months), but at the same time the transaction value was overwhelmingly higher than
in other years ($3 billion versus $1.2 billion).

5. Regression Analysis Results
To measure stock price returns, I examine stock returns over seven-day period
(-5, +1) around the merger announcement date for targets, bidders, and combined firms.
Market returns are subtracted from raw returns to obtain each firm's abnormal returns
according to the formula: Abnonnal Returns

= Finn Returns - Market.

Abnormal returns are

expressed as follows: CART, CARB, DEL JNT. CART is defined as cumulative abnormal
returns to the target, while CARB represents bidder returns. DEL JNT measures Combined
Finn Change in Value, defined as the changes in the sum of bidder and target market values
around the announcement date, thereby taking into account the relative size of the two
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mergmg

firms. Additionally,

a distinction

IS made between

merger modes: tender offer

versus merger (see Table 2).
The primary purpose of the regression analysis is to determine whether the variables
in this study affect the abnormal returns of the merging firms (target, bidder and combined).
Second, regression analysis seeks to explain which, if any, variables specifically relate to the
pharmaceutical industry.

5.1. Target returns
Prior literature suggests that tender offers result in higher returns than those from
traditional mergers. The first regression in Table 4, therefore, tests whether or not there is a
difference in abnormal returns based on the type of transaction (tender offer versus merger):
CART (Total Returns)

=rJo + rJIType

[1]

+E 1

The results, however, do not indicate that the returns for tender offers are different
(p-value equal to 0.10). Furthermore, the adjusted R-square is -0.02, implying that the
transaction type variable is not an important factor. Therefore, the target returns are not
related (whether the transaction is a merger or tender offer). The second regression in Table 4
introduces the following variables: the form of payment (cash or stock), number of days
(Days), and the merger amount:
CART

= rJo

+ rJl Type + rJ2 Cash + rJ3 Stock+ rJ4 Days + rJ5 Amount

+E 1

[2]

Similar to the first regression, none of the p-values are significant, leading to the
conclusion that none of these variables explain target returns. Anecdotally, the p-value for
the cash variable equals to 0.11. This finding suggests that, marginally, targets have higher
returns if the bidder pays cash.
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5.2. Bidder returns
Regression 3 of Table 4 tests whether there is a difference in the bidder's abnormal
returns based on the type of transaction. Regression for the bidder suggests, comparable to
the target results, that the acquisition mode is not significant to the outcome of the analysis:
CARB (Total Returns)

=~o+ ~lType

+E 1

[3]

Regression 4 of Table 4 takes into account additional variables for bidder returns: the
form of payment (cash or stock), number of days (Days), and the merger amount:
CARB

=~o+ ~1 Type

+ ~2 Cash + ~3 Stock+ ~4 Days + ~5 Amount +E 1

[4]

Consistent with the target's regression results, none of the p-values are significant, leading to
the conclusion that these variables do not explain target's announcement period returns.

5.3. Combined returns
Consistent with the previous testing methods, for the merged firms, Regression 5 of
Table 4 analysis examines whether the difference between tender offer and merger is
significant for the combined firm:
DEL JOINT

= ~o + ~lType

+E 1

[5]

The evidence shows that the p-value of the transaction type variable is not significant,

as is the case with bidder and target returns; this suggests that returns from tender offers are
not different from mergers. The last regression (Regression 6 of Table 4) includes the same
additional variables as with bidder and target regressions:
DEL JNT

=~o+ ~1 Type

+ ~2 Cash + ~3 Stock+ ~4 Days + ~5 Amount +E 1
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[6]

The results yet again indicate that none of the variables are significant; the models are
not a good fit and do not appear to explain variations in the independent variable (returns).
However, the p-value for the length of merger (number of days) is close to significance (pvalue of 0.11). Contrary to hypothesis #2, the number of days is directly related to higher
returns. Therefore, marginally, the longer the merger, the higher the achieved returns.
Suggesting that some pharmaceutical mergers may not be well planned.

6. Conclusions and Implications
Examining a sample of 45 pharmaceutical mergers from 1995-2000, I find no
consistent evidence that traditional variables explain merger returns. Prior literature suggests
that pharmaceutical industry mergers should have characteristics similar to mergers in other
industries. However, evidence shows that in the short-run, pharmaceutical mergers are
distinct from other mergers in several ways. First, pharmaceutical mergers are shorter in
duration compared to the overall market. Next, target shareholders enjoy substantial gains in
the short run, and the bidders incur insignificant losses.
While these results are similar to prior studies of non-pharmaceutical mergers, the
combined effect on the returns of the merged firm are inconclusive.

The analysis of

combined returns are mixed due to a small number of very unprofitable mergers that drive
average returns down. Median returns are slightly higher, which suggests that the wealth
effect of the middle range mergers is positive. Nonetheless, it remains questionable whether
pharmaceutical mergers are profitable.
Furthermore, in contrast to the prior literature, neither merger value nor type of
transaction translates into higher wealth gains for bidders or targets. Only on a marginal level
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do cash mergers have higher returns. The length of the merger also appears related to
profitability; the longer the merger the higher the returns. Overall, it is still unknown what
drives the returns of pharmaceutical mergers and whether they remain profitable in the long
run. However, traditional variables such as method of payment and transaction type do not
explain the returns from pharmaceutical mergers. Future studies will need to examine
additional variables such as asset size and profitability measures, among others, to better
determine the motivations for mergers in the pharmaceutical industry.
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Table 1
Summary Statistics of Regression Variables
This table provides summary statistics for regression variables for a sample of 45 pharmaceutical
mergers from 1995-2000. Number of Days is the number of days from the initial announcement date
to merger completion date. Merger Amount is the $ million value of the merger at the initial
announcement date. Target and Bidder Returns are net-of-market returns over a seven-day (-5, +1)
event window around the initial announcement date. Combined Returns are defined as the
changes in the sum of bidder and target market values around the announcement date,
thereby taking into account the relative size of the two merging firms. Net-of-market returns
are calculated using simple abnormal returns, where a value-weighted market index is subtracted
from each fIrm's simple returns.

Variables
Number of Days

Mean

Median

Minimum

Maximum

139

99

91

236

1,344.49

147

84.50

3,126.62

Bidder Returns

-2.01 %

-1.07%

-27.84%

25.63%

Target Returns

19.12%

15.81%

-20.30%

96.73%

Combined Returns

-0.8 0%

0.42%

-22.66%

23.21 %

Merger Amount ($ millions)
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Table 2
Summary Statistics by Merger Type
This table details summary statistics for acquisitions, tender offers, and all mergers for a
sample of 45 pharmaceutical mergers from 1995-2000. Number of Days is the length of time
from merger announcement to completion in days. Merger Amount is the $ million value of the
merger at the initial announcement date. Target and Bidder Returns are net-of-market returns over a
seven-day (-5, + 1) event window around the initial announcement date. Target and bidder returns are
net-of-market returns over a seven-day (-5, +1) event window around the initial announcement date.
Combined Returns are defined as the changes in the sum of bidder and target market values
around the announcement date, thereby taking into account the relative size of the two
merging firms. Net-of-market returns are calculated using simple abnormal returns, where a valueweighted market index is subtracted from each firm's simple returns. Stock mergers are all mergers
financed with 100% stock, while cash mergers are all mergers financed with cash only.

Acquisition

Tender
Offer

All
Mergers

38

7

45

Mean number of days

155

50

139

Median number of days

101

36

99

Mean merger amount ($ millions)

643.89

5,147.73

1,344.49

Median merger amount ($ millions)

159.50

95.10

147.00

Mean target returns

19.14%

18.98%

19.12%

Median target returns

16.02%

9/11 %

15.81%

Mean bidder returns

-2.45%

0.38%

-2.01 %

Median bidder returns

-1.31%

-1.07%

-1.07%

Mean combined returns

-0.66%

-1.52%

-0.80%

1.55%

-1.10%

0.42%

Cash

2

5

7

Stock

31

2

33

Variable
Number of mergers

Median combined returns
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Table 4
Regression Analysis
This table details regression analysis on 45 pharmaceutical mergers from 1990-1998 for targets,
bidders, and combined firms (p-values of coefficients are in parentheses). Target and Bidder
Returns are net-of-market returns over a seven-day (-5, +1) event window around the initial
announcement date. Combined Returns are defined as the changes in the sum of bidder
and target market values around the announcement date, thereby taking into account the
relative size of the two merging firms. Net-of-market returns are calculated using simple
abnormal returns, where a value-weighted market index is subtracted from each firm's simple
returns. Transaction Type is a binary variable equal to one if the transaction was a tender offer.
Cash and Stock Dummies are binary variables equal to one if the merger was financed with 100%
cash or stock, respectively. Number of Days is the length of time from the merger
announcement to completion date in days. Merger Amount is the dollar million value of the
merger at the initial announcement date.

Target Returns
Variable

Equation
1

Bidders Returns

Equation
2

Equation
3

Equation
4

Combined Returns
Equation
5

Equation
6

Intercept

0.19
(0.00)

0.05
(0.64)

-0.02
(0.17)

-0.03
(0.51)

-0.00
(0.67)

-0.04
(0.38)

Transaction type

-0.00
(0.99)

-0.13
(0.38)

0.02
(0.53)

0.01
(0.83)

-0.00
(0.83)

-0.03
(0.59)

Cash dummy

0.29
(0.11)

0.00
(0.95)

0.05
(0.52)

Stock dummy

0.09
(0.44)

-0.01
(0.74)

0.00
(0.88)

Days

0.00
(0.22)

0.00
(0.21)

0.00
(0.11)

Amount

0.00
(0.59)

0.00
(0.36)

0.00
(0.35)

Adjusted R2

-0.02

-0.03

-0.01
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-0.06

-0.02

-0.04

